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 This paper examines the impact of U.S. steel antidumping duties on trade patterns with 
both countries that are named on the duty and countries that are not named. The purpose of an 
antidumping duty is to punish the named dumping countries (companies) and reduce imports 
from them, which will help U.S. firms regain market share. The issue that arises from 
antidumping duties is the idea that trade may be diverted from the named countries to the non-
named countries once a duty is imposed, leaving U.S. firms in a similar position as before the 
antidumping duty was imposed. The panel dataset the paper uses comes from antidumping data 
from the Global Antidumping Database of the World Bank and U.S. import data from the U.S. 
International Trade Commission. This paper uses four different specifications to measure the 
impact of a steel antidumping duty on U.S. steel imports. The first and second specifications 
focus on how U.S. steel imports from named countries are impacted, while the third and fourth 
focus on how U.S. steel imports from non-named countries are impacted. I find that after an 
antidumping duty is initiated and/or imposed, steel imports from named countries decrease. I 
also find that steel imports from non-named countries increase once a duty has been place on a 











 President Trump has greatly raised the visibility of U.S. tariff policy during his 
presidency. The Trump Administration’s use of tariff policy is largely retaliatory, by imposing 
tariffs on countries, and firms in countries, whom he accuses of competing unfairly in 
international markets. President Trump has imposed tariffs on many goods such as steel and 
aluminum. Producers from many countries are affected by these tariffs, such as the European 
Union, Canada, and Mexico. President Trump’s tariffs on China especially have escalated and 
led to a trade war between the two countries. His goal of the tariffs is to counteract the unfair 
advantages of foreign producers so that U.S. firms will face a level playing field.  
 While this has been a very active U.S. policy, it is difficult to assess how successful it has 
been. Success is defined as reducing trade with the accused country and improving the position 
of U.S. firms. In this paper, I examine the evidence from earlier U.S. use of retaliatory tariff 
policy on steel to judge what impact it has had on trade with the accused country. I also look to 
see whether the retaliatory tariffs led to an increase in steel imports from other non-accused 
countries, leaving the U.S. steel firms in a similar position compared to the international 
marketplace. By using an estimation that follows the format of an import function, I find that 
imported good from the accused country is reduced impacted by the duty. I also find an increase 
in steel imports from the non-accused countries, which means that trade diversion takes place.   
 This paper focuses on the U.S. steel industry since many of the Trump Administration’s 
tariffs focus on steel goods. Also, the U.S. steel industry had been the major world supplier of 
steel during the mid-20th century, but began to fall out of position towards the end of the century. 
This may have been due to increases in steel production in other countries, leading them to not 
rely on U.S. steel anymore. With less share of the world steel market and more competition, U.S. 
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steel antidumping duties may have been seen as a way to combat unfair trade with foreign steel 
companies and help U.S. steel firms regain market share. By focusing on U.S. steel antidumping 
duties, we examine whether they reduced imports from accused countries and helped domestic 
firms regain their market share. 
 The layout of this paper will proceed as follows. The market implications of tariff policy 
are discussed in section 2. Literature on how to measure the effects of retaliatory tariffs is 
presented in section 3. The data, empirical model, and results of this paper are detailed in section 
4. Lastly, the conclusions drawn from this paper and possible extensions from this paper are 
discussed in section 5. 
 
2. Market implications of tariff policy 
Commercial Policy 
 Commercial policy is an umbrella term that is used to describe government interventions 
to influence the pattern and volume of international trade. There are different types of trade 
policies that could be used to achieve either trade expansion or trade compression (Appleyard & 
Field, 2013). Trade expansion policies would be used to help incentivize trade between 
countries. Some examples of this kind of policy are import and export subsidies. Trade 
compression policies are the opposite of trade expansion policies, since they are used to decrease 
trade between countries. Import tariffs would fall into this category of commercial policy. 
 
Goals of import tariffs 
 There can be different goals of an import tariff. One goal would be to raise revenue for 
the government. An import tariff is a tax on an imported good and that tax will go to the 
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government treasury. Many developing countries have used import tariffs as a way of generating 
revenue. Another goal of an import tariff would be to protect newly established domestic 
industries from foreign competitors. Since the domestic industry is new, it may be difficult to 
compete with a well-established competitor, so countries can implement an import tariff to help 
the new domestic industry grow and establish itself. One last goal of an import tariff is to protect 
domestic producers from low-cost foreign competition. The domestic producers need the 
assistance of a tariff since there is low demand for their good compared to the high demand for a 
low-cost foreign good. 
 
Evolution of tariffs 
The use of tariffs in the U.S. has changed significantly over time. When the Great 
Depression hit, international trade contracted immensely. The U.S. Congress enacted the Smoot-
Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, which raised tariffs on over 20,000 imported goods (Irwin, 2017). 
These tariff rates were the second highest in U.S. history and they led to major consequences. 
Other countries retaliated against the U.S. by significantly increasing their own trade barriers. In 
1934, Congress passed the Reciprocal Tariff Act, which gave the executive branch the power to 
negotiate bilateral tariff reduction agreements with other countries (Irwin, 2017). This power was 
used to help reduce tariff rates with multiple countries. After World War II, the General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT) was created, where multiple nations joined together to 
help promote international trade by reducing barriers to trade. Through multilateral negotiations, 
tariff rates were negotiated downward multiple times from 1948 to 1994 (Irwin, 2017). GATT 
was then replaced by the World Trade Organization (WTO) in 1994, which continued the effort 
to negotiate uniform tariff rates. 
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 Import tariffs can sometimes be classified as retaliatory tariffs when a country is either 
retaliating against unfair trading practices or against a destabilizing inflow of goods from foreign 
producers. Retaliatory tariffs have become more commonly used in recent years. They can be 
broken down further into specific types of retaliatory tariffs. A countervailing duty is a tariff that 
is imposed on a specific good from a specific country where the government is subsidizing the 
export of that good (Appleyard & Field, 2013). Because of the subsidy, firms in the foreign 
country can export the good at a lower price, which hurts domestic producers. Another type of 
retaliatory tariff is a safeguard duty. This duty can be imposed if a sudden increase in imports of 
a specific good causes concern for the domestic industry (Appleyard & Field, 2013). These 
duties are on a specific good, but are imposed on all countries instead of specified export 
countries. These duties do not require evidence of unfair competition in order to be enacted. 
One more type of retaliatory tariff is a response to a firm in a foreign country that dumps 
its exports on the domestic country. Dumping occurs when an exporting foreign company sells a 
product to an importing country at a price that is lower in the importing country’s market than 
the exporting country’s market (WTO | Anti-dumping—Technical Information, n.d.). This is 
unfair since the foreign company artificially lowered its export price in order to drive out the 
domestic competition. The retaliatory tariff that is used to combat dumping is an antidumping 
duty. It should be made clear that antidumping duties are imposed on the specific foreign 
companies that are dumping and not the entire foreign country. An antidumping duty is imposed 
on the exporting company at a value that is equal to the dumping margin. The dumping margin is 
defined as the difference between the fair market price of the good and the lower export price 
from the foreign company to the importing country (Appleyard & Field, 2013).  
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For the U.S. there is a process that takes place in order for an antidumping duty to be 
levied. First, the domestic industry files an antidumping petition to both the International Trade 
Administration (ITA) of the U.S. Department of Commerce and the International Trade 
Commission (ITC). The ITA will determine whether the dumping occurred and, if so, the margin 
of dumping. The ITC will determine if there is material injury to the firm as a result of the 
dumping (Understanding Antidumping & Countervailing Duty Investigations | USITC, n.d.). If 
the petition is accepted by both the ITA and ITC, then an antidumping investigation is initiated 
(Malhotra et al., 2008). If the ITA and ITC find evidence of dumping and injury, then an 
antidumping duty is imposed on the exporting company at a value that is equal to the dumping 
margin. 
 
Impact of tariffs 
 To illustrate the impact of a tariff, we must first understand how trade works in the free 
market scenario. First, we will define the dumping margin to see how it applies in both the free 




where the variable 𝑃* represents the world price of the good (in this case steel), while the 
variable 𝑃+, is the export price of the foreign company in the named country group. We can 
solve for 𝑃+,, which results in the equation 
𝑃+, = 𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀). 
Now in the free market scenario, the dumping margin would be equal to zero, so 𝑃+, = 𝑃*. 
Next, we can create quantity demand and quantity supply equations for three different 
country groups, the United States (U), the named countries (N), and non-named countries (NN). 
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In this free market example, the named countries are not dumping and have not been imposed 
with a tariff. We split up both named and non-named countries now so that when the tariff is 
placed on the named countries we will know how it impacts each of those groups.  
The Global Steel Market 
Supply 
𝑄+2 = 700 + 10 ∗ 𝑃* − 40  
𝑄+, = 100 + 10 ∗ 𝑃* − 40  
𝑄+,, = 100 + 10 ∗ 𝑃* − 40  
Demand 
𝑄82 = 15460 − 10𝑃* 
𝑄8, = 8320 − 10𝑃* 
𝑄8,, = 8320 − 10𝑃* 
The variable 𝑄+ is the quantity supplied of steel goods from a country. The variable 𝑄8 is the 
quantity demanded of steel goods by that country. The total quantity supplied can be calculated 
by adding each of the quantity supplied equations together. The same process can be done for 
demand in order to get the total quantity demanded. In this example, the total quantity supplied 
and demanded are represented by the equations 
𝑄+> = 900 + 30 ∗ 𝑃* − 40 , 
𝑄8> = 32100 − 30𝑃*. 
To find the free market price, we can set 𝑄+> and 𝑄8> equal to each other and then solve for 𝑃*. 
By doing this, we find that 𝑃*=$540. We can then solve for the quantity supplied and quantity 
demanded for each of the country groups. For the U.S., quantity supplied equals 5,700 units. For 
both the named and non-named countries, quantity supplied equals 5,100 units for each. On the 
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demand side, quantity demanded by the U.S. equals 10,060 units, and for the named and non-
named countries quantity demand equals 2,920 units for each. This example shows that in the 
free trade market, the U.S. has the largest quantity supplied and quantity demanded for the steel 
goods.  
 Next, we focus on the imports and exports from each of these country groups. The 
imports equation for each group are calculated by subtracting the 𝑄+ equation from the 𝑄8 
equation for each group. This results in the following equations 
𝑄82 − 𝑄+2 = 15160 − 20𝑃* 
𝑄8, − 𝑄+, = 8620 − 20𝑃* 
𝑄8,, − 𝑄+,, = 8620 − 20𝑃* 
We then input 𝑃*=$540 to calculate the imports by each group. The U.S. imports equal 4,360 
units. The imports for the named and non-named country groups equal -2,180 units for each. The 
negative means that both of these groups are actually exporting 2,180 units to the United States. 
That means the U.S. is importing the same number of units from both named and non-named 
countries in this free trade equilibrium. 
 Now let’s see what changes when we add in the dumping done by the named countries. 
As stated previously, dumping is when an exporting foreign company artificially sets the price of 
steel goods lower than fair market value. Going back to the equation 
𝑃+, = 𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀),  
we can see how the named foreign company now has a lower price, 𝑃+,, since the dumping 
margin no longer equals zero.  
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There are also changes to the quantity supplied and demanded equations. First, we will 
focus on the changes to quantity supplied equation of the named countries. Their new quantity 
supplied equation is  
𝑄+, = 100 + 10 ∗ [𝑃* 1 − 𝐷𝑀 − 40] + 20𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀. 
Now that 𝑃+, = 𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀), we see that 𝑃+, has been substituted in order to include the 
dumping margin. With a dumping margin greater than zero, the new price for named steel 
products will decrease. This is artificially and purposefully done by the named company in that 
country in order for them to have a greater market share in the United States. To better 
understand the new 20𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀 part of the equation, we can look back to free market quantity 





Next, in order to change this to represent dumping from a named company, we can add in this 
new portion of the equation in order to get  




This 20𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀 part of the equation represents the loss that the name company in the country 
accrues due to artificially lowering their price of steel exports. This loss will hurt the name 
company in the short run, but if they are able to reach their goal of increasing market share in the 
U.S. then they will be able to make up for these losses in the future. That explains how at first 
dumping is unprofitable for the named company, but could become greatly beneficial to the 
company.   
 Next we can focus on how dumping changes the quantity supplied equation for the 
United States. The new equation would become 
𝑄+2 = 700 + 10 ∗ [𝑃* 1 − 𝐷𝑀 − 40]. 
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The only change is that the price is now equal to 𝑃+,, just with 𝑃* 1 − 𝐷𝑀  substituted in. This 
happens due to the elasticity of substitution of domestic and foreign goods. That means since the 
named companies reduced their price of steel, the U.S. producers will have to reduce their price 
as well in order to compete. With a high elasticity of substitution, domestic firms will change to 
the same price, because if they do not they will easily lose their share of the market.  
The last change occurs with the quantity demanded equation for the United States. The 
new equation becomes  
𝑄82 = 15460 − 10𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀). 
Again, the change is that the demanded price is now equal to 𝑃+,. Now that the cheaper steel 
products are being dumped into the U.S., the price in the quantity demanded equation will drop 
to the foreign price. This also explains why the price in the U.S. quantity supplied changes as 
well, since all the demand will be for steel goods that are sold at the cheaper price. 
 The remaining quantity supplied and demanded equations will remain the same. The 
respective equations for all country groups in the dumping example are 
The Global Steel Market 
Supply 
𝑄+2 = 700 + 10 ∗ [𝑃* 1 − 𝐷𝑀 − 40] 
𝑄+, = 100 + 10 ∗ [𝑃* 1 − 𝐷𝑀 − 40] + 20𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀 
𝑄+,, = 100 + 10 ∗ 𝑃* − 40  
Demand 
𝑄82 = 15460 − 10𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀) 
𝑄8, = 8320 − 10𝑃* 
𝑄8,, = 8320 − 10𝑃* 
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Both the quantity demanded equations for the named and non-named countries remain the same 
since neither are benefiting from the cheaper price of named exports of steel. The named 
companies are dumping only on the U.S., so the other country groups still have the same price. 
The quantity supplied for non-named countries remains the same since they are not being 
dumped by the named countries and do not have to compete with the cheaper steel products. 
We can see what happens when the named foreign companies artificially decrease their 
exporting price of steel to $340, and create a dumping margin of 0.4138. By solving the dumping 





When we input $340 for 𝑃+, and 0.4138 for 𝐷𝑀, we find that 𝑃* equals $580. We can now use 
these prices to find the new amount of quantity supplied and demanded for each country group. 
The U.S. quantity supplied becomes 3,700 units, while named country quantity supplied 
becomes 7,900 units and non-named quantity supplied becomes 5,500 units. Comparing these 
numbers to the ones in the free market scenario, the quantity supplied for the U.S. decreases by 
2,000 units. Non-named countries quantity supplied increases by 300 units, while quantity 
supplied for named countries increases by 2,800 units.  
 We see changes in quantity demanded as well, with U.S. quantity demanded becoming 
12,060 units, while named and non-named countries quantity demanded becoming 2,520 units 
each. U.S. quantity demanded increased by 2,000 units, while named and non-named countries 
quantity demanded decreased by 400 units each. We see that in the dumping scenario, named 
countries are supplying much more steel compared to the other groups, while the U.S. is 
demanding more for steel products since they are the ones that are being dumped with the 
cheaper steel products. 
	 	
14 
 Changes in quantity demand and quantity supply also cause changes in the import 
equations. By subtracting the 𝑄8 equation by the 𝑄+ equation for each group, we see the 
following import equations 
𝑄82 − 𝑄+2 = 15160 − 20𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀) 
𝑄8, − 𝑄+, = 8620 − 20𝑃* − 10𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀 
𝑄8,, − 𝑄+,, = 8620 − 20𝑃*. 
We can calculate the number of imports by each group by inputting $580 for the world price and 
0.4138 for the dumping margin. By doing this we see that the U.S. imports become 8,360 units. 
The named countries exports become 5,380 units and the non-named countries exports become 
2,980 units. Comparing these imports and exports to the free market example, the U.S. imports 
4,000 more units, with the majority coming from the named countries, since the named countries 
are exporting 3,200 more units. This makes sense because with a lower export price, named 





























The impact of the dumping on the U.S. can be further explored in Figure 1 above. This 
figure shows the U.S. market for steel goods and how it is impacted by the dumping country. The 
market price decreases from $540 to $340, since the U.S. goes from importing at the free market 
price to the lower export price of the foreign companies. That causes quantity demand to increase 
and quantity supply to decrease for the United States. Both consumer surplus and producer 
surplus are effected by this change in price due to dumping. Consumer surplus is defined by the 
area bounded by the demand curve on top and the market price on the bottom. Producer surplus 
is the area bounded by the market price on top and the supply curve on the bottom (Appleyard & 
Field, 2013). We see that consumer surplus increases by the area ABJG, while producer surplus 
decreases by the area ABDE. It makes sense that consumers would benefit since they can now 
purchase steel goods for a cheaper price, even if that price is artificially set. Producers would be 
hurt from the dumping since they are now competing against a cheaper product. Welfare loss 
from the dumping good can also be seen from the areas CDE and GJI. This represents the cost to 
society by the dumping of the steel goods. This provides another reason that the U.S. is 
negatively impacted by the dumping countries. 
To counteract the dumping from the foreign companies, the U.S. can implement a tariff 
to retaliate. In this case, the tariff would be an antidumping duty. The value of the duty would be 
equal to the dumping margin, so in this case it would equal 0.4138. In the equations from above, 
the tariff (𝑇) would be included in the equation for 𝑃,+ seen below 
𝑃+, = 𝑃*(1 − 𝐷𝑀)(1 + 𝑇). 
As stated above, 𝑇 = 𝐷𝑀 so that means that (1 − 𝐷𝑀)(1 + 𝑇) would approximately equal 1. 
This is done by the U.S. in order to bring the price from the named countries back to equaling the 
world price. If the name companies continue dumping while the tariff is in place, then they will 
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continue to be hurt by the losses of 20𝑃* ∗ 𝐷𝑀, and that will continue in the long-run as long as 
the tariff remains in place. Implementing an antidumping duty should effectively increase the 
price of steel from the named foreign companies and lead to a decrease in imports from those 
companies. 
While these impacts of an antidumping duty are expected, there are other ways that trade 
could be impacted from the duty. Instead of the U.S. going back to buying steel from U.S. steel 
producers, trade could be diverted from the named countries to the non-named countries instead. 
That would leave U.S. firms back in the situation as when the named countries were dumping, 
since consumers start importing from non-named countries instead of going back to relying on 
U.S. firms for the steel goods. That is one of the main issues of antidumping duties explored in 
this paper and should be taken into consideration when a country implements an antidumping 
duty.  
 
3. Literature Review 
 My paper contributes to literature focused on free trade agreements and trade diversion. 
Russ and Swenson (2019) look at the impact of the South Korea-U.S. Free Trade Agreement 
(KORUS) on trade diversion from other countries. They look at U.S. imports two years after the 
creation of KORUS to see how U.S. import patterns change and if there is any diversion that 
takes place. Their estimates find that the trade diversion sum was 13.1 billion in 2013 and 13.8 
billion in 2014. They also find that these estimates of trade diversion are roughly the same 
magnitude as the increase in the U.S. bilateral good trade deficit with South Korea. This study is 
similar to my paper since it focuses on estimating the amount of trade diversion that occurs after 
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an international policy is imposed. The difference is that my paper focuses on antidumping 
duties impact on trade diversion instead of Free Trade Agreements.  
My paper also contributes to literature that looks specifically at antidumping duties. Prusa 
(1996) looks at the effect of all U.S. antidumping duties (AD duty) from 1980 to 1988 on trade 
volume and trade diversion. He looks at the trade effect on named countries in the duties, as well 
as on non-named countries in order to show the level of trade diversion, which is the same 
method that is applied in this paper. The findings were that AD duties restricted the volume of 
trade for named countries, substantial trade diversion from named countries to non-named 
countries occurred, and AD petitions that were rejected still decreased imports from those named 
countries. While his study is fairly similar to this paper, there still are some key differences. This 
paper focuses only on one U.S. industry (steel), studies more recent AD duties (1990-2000), and 
uses more than just a year dummy variable to control for macroeconomic trends. By using more 
controls for macroeconomic trends, my paper helps control for potential bias from omitting key 
variables that impact U.S. imports (ex. U.S. production, foreign prices, exchange rate).  
Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) take a different approach compared to Prusa by 
focusing only on the U.S. agriculture sector. Their paper is important since it focuses on a 
specific industry (agriculture) to understand the effect of antidumping duties, which is similar to 
how my paper focuses on U.S. steel imports. The results show that there is a significant effect of 
antidumping duties on imports from named countries. Imports decrease by 64% in the first year 
if the decision is affirmative and the duty is imposed. If the decision is negative, though, there is 
no significant change in imports from named countries. Interestingly, there is no significant 
evidence of trade diversion, even for affirmative decisions.  
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These studies have covered the topic of antidumping duties by focusing on all U.S. 
antidumping duties, as well as just U.S. agricultural duties. My paper will attempt to explore 
U.S. steel antidumping duties. It is important to understand the effectiveness of antidumping 
duties on U.S. steel industry, since the industry lost world market share towards the end of the 
20th century (Bartholomew, 2019). After World War II, the demand for steel across the globe 
increased, since many countries needed to rebuild infrastructure and did not have enough steel 
production to do so. The U.S. steel industry greatly benefitted by providing many of these 
countries with steel. After some time, though, these countries were able to rebuild their steel 
mills and increase their own steel production (Bartholomew, 2019). This lead to the U.S. steel 
industry having less influence in the world market and also having to deal with more strong 
competition. In order to retain market share, U.S. steel antidumping duties may have been a way 
to combat unfair steel trade and help domestic steel producers compete with foreign companies.  
The issue that may arise, though, is the idea that trade will be diverted to other countries 
that are not impacted by an AD duty. Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) saw no significant 
evidence of trade diversion for the U.S. agriculture industry. They considered this may make 
sense because there are few large supplier countries for agriculture. If an AD duty is imposed on 
the large suppliers, then it would be difficult for the remaining non-named countries to replace 
them. This is how the steel industry may be different when it come to trade diversion. There are 
many strong foreign competitors in the steel industry, so if some are targeted with an AD duty, 
trade could be shifted to the others that are not impacted by the duty. With the substitution of 
trade from named to non-named country being more elastic for steel compared to agriculture, we 
may see more significant trade diversion with steel. 
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My paper also uses a model that will be different than these studies’ models. The key 
variables will be similar to previous papers, but this model will contain more control variables to 
minimize the omitted variable bias within the model. Previous models only include calendar 
dummies to control for macroeconomic trends, but this paper will include variables for foreign 
prices, U.S. production, foreign production, exchange rates, and then month and year dummies to 
control for seasonality. Looking at the steel industry and adjusting the model will help in further 
understanding antidumping duties and their impact on trade diversion.  
 
4. Empirical Results 
I. Data 
 In order to examine the effects of antidumping duties on trade, panel trade data is 
constructed. First, the antidumping data is collected from the Global Antidumping Database 
(GAD) which is maintained by the World Bank (Data Catalog, n.d.). This dataset contains 
information on all the antidumping duties the U.S. has introduced from 1980 to 2015, including 
the country it was imposed on, the initiation date, and the actual size of the duty (as a 
percentage). The U.S. uses Harmonized Tariff Schedule (HTS) to categorize different products 
by assigning each product with an HTS number. Antidumping duties are levied by product, so 
the GAD data contains the HTS number for each product that was imposed with a duty. The 
duties that covered steel products from 1990 to 2000 are selected since they are the type of 
products and time period that this paper centers on. These selected duties cover 37 different types 
of steel products (flat-rolled steel, bars and rods of stainless steel, hot-rolled coil steel, etc.) Table 
1 shows the most frequent countries that were named in an antidumping duty. Table 2 shows the 
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number of countries with firms that were initiated with an antidumping case per year. It shows 
that 1992 had the largest number of countries with initiated firms, while 1995 only had three. 
Table 1: Most Frequently Named Countries, 1990-2000 
Country Number of AD Cases 
Japan 18 
South Korea 16 








Table 2: Number of countries initiated with AD case per year 














 Next, U.S. import data for all the steel products included on an antidumping duty is 
collected. The U.S. import data is collected from the U.S. International Trade Commission 
(USITC) import database (Data Request | DataWeb, n.d.). The same HTS product numbers from 
GAD database are used when retrieving import data from USITC. U.S. imports of each steel 
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product from all countries is collected within the time frame of 1989 to 2003 and are measured in 
quantity terms. It is also collected as monthly data, in order to see the immediate impact of the 
duties. One restriction made to the data is dropping countries when they only exported a certain 
steel product once during the entire 1989-2003 time period. After collecting both the import and 
AD data, the two datasets are merged and then grouped by country and product in order to create 
a panel dataset that does not have any duplicate observations.  
 The merged dataset is the what will be used in the regression. There are 180 months of 
data (1989-2003) for 37 categories of steel products. For each steel product, the quantity of 
imports is measured from each exporting country, which is about 50 exporters per steel product. 
Within the dataset, named countries and non-named countries are categorized. To do this, 
a named dummy variable is created to represent which countries have a duty placed on them for 
a certain steel product at a certain time period. The named variable will equal 1 if a duty is 
initiated for a specific steel product from a country and it will remain equal to 1 until either the 
duty is not imposed or the duty was imposed but is no longer imposed. Figure 2 shows a timeline 





In this timeline the time variable is t, which represents months. We see that in t=2 an 
antidumping case is opened up, which starts the investigation. The investigation continues until 
the ITC and ITA decide whether or not the duty should be imposed. Even if the duty is not 







Figure 2: Antidumping Duty Process Timeline 
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imposed, their can be an investigation effect, which means that by just starting an AD 
investigation imports from the named countries decrease. In this case, the duty is imposed in t=4, 
so we see how imports change after initiation of an investigation in t=2 and we see how they 
change further once the duty is imposed in t=4. That duty continues to be imposed on those 
named companies until a time period when the duty is removed. This would be done if the 
named company stops dumping or if the U.S. decided it no longer needed the duty to be in place. 
In this example, the duty remains imposed until t=10. In regard to the named variable described 
above, this company/country would have a named variable equaling 1 from t=2 to t=10. 
Otherwise, they are not considered named and the named variable equals 0. 
The dependent variable within the dataset is quantity of steel imports, while two key 
independent variables are duty and an interaction between duty and a decision dummy. Going 
back to Figure 2, the duty variable will equal the percentage of the duty throughout the 
antidumping process. There is a preliminary duty percentage announced once the investigation is 
initiated, but the duty percentage may change when it is decided to impose the duty. The decision 
dummy variable refers to that decision point on the timeline of whether or not to impose the 
duty. The decision dummy will equal 1 when a duty is levied and 0 if not. It will also remain 1 
for all the months that the duty is imposed. By interacting the duty variable with the decision 
dummy variable, we are able to see how imports change when a duty is levied or not.  
An issue arises when we focus on when countries are not being imposed with a duty. We 
want to see how these imports from non-named countries are affected when other named 
countries are initiated/imposed with an AD duty. The challenge is that multiple companies and 
countries are usually named on an antidumping duty and these different countries could have 
different duty percentages (ex. both Japan and Spain firms are named in an AD duty, but the 
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Japanese firm was taxed 50% and the Spanish firm was taxed 20%). That made it difficult to 
know what the duty variable should be for the non-named countries of that antidumping duty. A 
way to represent the duty effect is calculating a weighted duty variable for the non-named 











In this equation, 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S  represents the duty imposed on a country j for good i in time t. The 
variable 𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠Q,R&D
S  represents the imports of good i from a countries j (including both named 
and non-named) in time t-1, which is the month prior to the initiation of the duty. The weighted 
duty equation shows that it is equal to the sum of the duty percentages for all the countries 
named for a specific antidumping duty, and then multiplied by the share of total U.S. imports 
coming from the named countries. Imports from the month prior to the initiation of the duty are 
used in order to have imports that are not already impacted by the initiation of the duty. This new 
weighted duty variable will be used to represent the trade diversion that occurs from imposing an 
antidumping duty. It shows how imports from non-named countries are impacted due to the 
creation of an antidumping duty.  
 A duty+ variable will also be created and interacted with the weighted duty variable. The 
duty+ variable will equal 1 whenever the variable duty is not equal to 0, and it will take the value 
of 0 otherwise. This variable is created and interacted with the weighted duty variable in order to 
prevent any confounding effects that result from including the weighted duty variable into the 
regression. 
 The data for the control variables are collected from different sources. The USTIC import 
database reports both U.S. import values and quantities by source country. Unit values (foreign 
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prices) are calculated by dividing the import values by the quantities. The producer price index 
for steel and iron U.S. commodities comes from the Federal Reserve Economic Data (Producer 
Price Index by Commodity for Metals and Metal Products: Iron and Steel (WPU101) | FRED | 
St. Louis Fed, n.d.). A drawback of this index is that it includes more steel goods than those 
covered by the antidumping duties, but it still helps represent U.S. steel prices in the model. The 
exchange rate data is collected from the International Monetary Fund (Exchange Rate Archives 
by Month, n.d.). The exchange rate here is defined as the amount of foreign currency that can be 
purchased by one U.S. dollar. The foreign production of steel products (quantity produced in 
kilograms) is collected from Comtrade, which is made by the United Nations (Download trade 
data | UN Comtrade: International Trade Statistics, n.d.).  
 The inclusion of the foreign prices, U.S. prices and exchange rate are meant to represent 
the real exchange rate. Since we use a producer price index for U.S. steel commodities, this 
representation of the real exchange rate is not perfect. In order to improve this estimation, two 
new variables are created to be another representation of the real exchange rate. These variables 






In the first ratio, 𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒QS is the foreign price of steel good i from country j, and 𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒Q is the 
the foreign price of steel good i across all countries. In the second ratio, 𝐸𝑅S is the exchange rate 
from country j and 𝑃𝑃𝐼 is the producer price index for U.S. steel commodities. The first ratio 
will represent whether country j is a low-cost supplier of the steel product across all importers, 
and the second ratio will represent whether imports of steel product i are expensive on average 




Table 3: Summary Statistics 
Variable Observations Mean Std. Deviation Min Max 
Imports 259,560 281061.6 2005111 0 1.32e+08 
Duty 259,560 1.019262 0.1363964 1 6.9566 
Duty*Decision 259,560 0.0478194 0.2733709 0 3.4346 
Weighted Duty 259,560 1.065725 0.2527017 1 3.68296 
Weighted*Duty+ 259,560 0.0477288 0.2487615 0 3.68296 
PPI US Steel  259,560 118.6167 5.928704 107.1 130.4 
Foreign Price 259,560 4.449438 84.26966 0 9179 
Exchange Rate 259,560 88.30646 451.4898 0.3845 10125.1 
Foreign Prod 259,560 1.22e+08 2.57e+08 2 3.09e+09 
FPriceij/FPricei 259,560 2.714384 88.92502 0 21737.5 
FPricei/(ER*PPI) 259,560 0.0030113 0.009211 0 0.2435102 
 
 Table 3 shows the summary statistics of the different variables, with the dependent and 
key variables at the top of the table. For the regression model, these variables will be converted 
to logarithmic form. This is done to respond to skews in the data towards large values. There are 
countries that the U.S. imports extremely large quantities of steel from, while other countries 
export much smaller quantities. Converting to logarithmic form will help reduce this skew in the 
data. One note about this conversion is that any imports that equal zero will be excluded from the 
regression. Taking the log of zero results in an undefined value, which means these observations 
are not included. Table 3 shows there are 259,560 observations of imports, but after converting 
to logarithmic form the number of observations drop to 64,045. This unfortunately is not quite as 
many observations as previously stated, but it still is a large enough sample size to derive 
significant results. 
 
II. Empirical Model 
This paper uses an empirical model that relates to the equations displayed in section 2, 
but also adds other key variables that affect imports. It is similar since it uses imports as the 
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dependent variable and also uses a U.S. steel producer price index and unit values of foreign 
steel products to account for price, but the model adds other variables to control for different 
demand and supply shifters. The first model that is used in the regression is 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠Q,R
S = 𝛽E + 𝛽D𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S + 𝛽u 𝐷𝑒𝑐Q,R
S ∗ 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R





S +	𝛽{𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎR + 𝛽|𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟R + 𝛽DE𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡R +	𝜀Q,R. 
The dependent variable 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠Q,R
S  is the quantity of U.S. imports of product i from all 
countries j at time t (monthly). The variable 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S  denotes the size of the antidumping duty, 
as a percentage. The next variable is an interaction between 𝐷𝑒𝑐Q,R
S  and 𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S . The variable 
𝐷𝑒𝑐Q,R
S  is a decision dummy for each AD case and is equal to 1 when an AD proposal is affirmed 
and remains 1 for all months where the duty is imposed. These two variables are the key 
variables of this model and represent the impact of an antidumping duty on U.S. imports from 
the named countries. Adding the interaction will show the effect of not just proposing a duty, but 
also if the duty is levied.  
The next set of variables are control variables that are meant to decrease omitted variable 
bias by accounting for different macroeconomic factors that could affect U.S. imports of steel 
products. The first is 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑃𝐼R, which is the producer price index for U.S. steel and represents the 
U.S. price of steel. Foreign prices of steel are controlled for by the variable 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒Q,R
S , which is 
the unit values of each product from each country. The exchange rate with each country is 
controlled for with 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅R
S. The variable is 𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑜𝑑Q,R
S , which is the foreign production of each 
product i. This would control for an export-supply shifter. The variable 𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠Q,R&D
S  is the 
lagged U.S. imports for steel product i from all countries j. This variable represents the inertia of 
the importing decision, since last month’s imports are a good predictor of this month’s imports, 
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other things being equal. Lastly, the variables 𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎR and 𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟R are month and year dummies 
that will help control for seasonality and other macroeconomic trends and the variable 𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡R 
is a dummy that will control for the different steel products that that U.S. imports.  
As stated previously, the model follows a similar format as the equations in section 2. By 
adding the different duty key variables and accounting for other variables that could impact 
imports, this model more accurately estimates the amount of steel imports into the United States 
after accounting for antidumping duties. 
The next specification to this model would be changing the control variables to better 
represent the real exchange rate. This model would take away the separate variables of 𝑙𝑛𝑃𝑃𝐼R, 
𝑙𝑛𝐹𝑃𝑟𝑖𝑐𝑒Q,R
S , and 𝑙𝑛𝐸𝑅R
S, and instead include the logarithms of the two ratio variables. Together, 
these ratios will provide for a better understanding of the real exchange rate in the model. 
In order to calculate the amount of trade diversion that occurs from imposing 
antidumping duties, another specification to the model is made. For this regression, the model is 
𝑙𝑛𝐼𝑚𝑝𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑠Q,R
S = 𝛽E + 𝛽D𝑙𝑛𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R










S +	𝛽DE𝑚𝑜𝑛𝑡ℎR + 𝛽DD𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟R + 𝛽Du𝑝𝑟𝑜𝑑𝑢𝑐𝑡R +	𝜀Q,R. 
The changes in this empirical model are the inclusion of 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S  and the interaction 
between 𝑙𝑛𝑊𝑒𝑖𝑔ℎ𝑡𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦Q,R
S  and 𝐷𝑢𝑡𝑦𝑃𝑙𝑢𝑠R. The calculation of the weighted duty was addressed 
above, but it is meant to represent the duty effect on all countries. This will provide insight into 
the extent of trade diversion that occurs once an AD duty is initiated/imposed. The duty+ 
variable equals 1 whenever the duty variable is not zero. Since the weighted duty variable is 
applied to the named countries as well, there may be confounding effects from adding it to the 
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model. We attempt to control these confounding effects by adding in the interaction between 
weighted duty and duty+. The impact of the antidumping duty on the named countries can be 
seen by the three coefficients on the variables duty variable, the interaction between duty and 
decision, and the interaction between weighted duty and duty+. The remaining variables are the 
same as the first model. 
 One last specification is taking the third model and changing the variables that represent 
the real exchange rate. Just like the second specification, the two ratios will be included to have a 
better representation of the real exchange rate.  
 
III. Results 
 The first column of Table 4 shows the estimates for the first regression model. The results 
show that for a 1% change in Duty when a duty is initiated, imports from a named country 
decrease by 0.36%. This represents an investigation effect, since even though the duty is not 
imposed there is still a decrease in imports. When the duty is imposed, imports from the named 
country decrease by an additional 0.8% for a 1% change in Duty. This also makes sense because 
the purpose of the duty is to reduce the amount of U.S. imports from these named counties. The 
fact that imports decrease by a larger percentage after imposing the duty shows how effective 
antidumping duties can be at reducing trade with dumping nations. 
 The signs of the significant controls also make sense in this regression. The producer 
price index for U.S. steel has a positive relationship with U.S. imports. That is logical, since an 
increase in steel prices in the U.S. should lead to an increase in U.S. imports of cheaper steel 
from other countries. Foreign price has a negative relationship with imports, showing that when 
foreign steel prices increase U.S. steel imports will decrease. The exchange rate has a positive 
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relationship with imports, which means that the U.S. imports more as the dollar gets stronger. 
This does make sense, since a stronger dollar makes imports cheaper, thus increasing imports.  
 The second column displays the regression results for the second specification of the 
model. This model contains the two ratios that make up the real exchange rate instead of 
including those variables independently. These results show a 1% increase in Duty when a duty 
is initiated leads to a 0.4% decrease in U.S. steel imports from a named country. Imposing the 
duty leads to an additional 0.915% decrease for a 1% increase in Duty. The investigation effect 
seems to be similar as the previous specification, but the additional decrease in U.S. steel imports 
after imposing a duty is even larger than the results from the previous model. This again shows 
the strong impact against dumping countries when an antidumping duty is imposed. Going back 
to the example in section 2, we saw that dumping countries take a loss once they begin to dump. 
If nothing stops them from dumping, then in the long run they will obtain more market share and 
be able to offset those losses. Imposing an AD duty on the dumping country means that the 
dumping country will continue to take losses as long as they have an artificially lower price.  
 The signs on the new ratios to represent the real exchange rate make sense. This first one 
represents whether a country is a low-cost producer of steel compared to all countries. The sign 
for this ratio is negative, which means that the higher the cost a country is at producing steel, the 
less the U.S. will import from them. The second ratio tells us whether imports of a certain steel 
product are expensive on average relative to domestic production. The negative coefficient on 
this ratio means that the more expensive the steel product is compared to domestic production, 
the less the U.S. will import that steel product. Both of these new ratios are significant and show 
the correct sign. 
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 The third column shows the results for the regression model with weighted duty and the 
interaction between weighted duty and duty+. The amount of trade diversion that occurs when an 
antidumping duty is placed on a country is represented in the coefficient for weighted duty. The 
results show that for a 1% increase in weighted duty, U.S. steel imports from one non-named 
country increase by 0.088%. This shows that there is trade diversion from imposing an AD duty 
on a named country. The impact on U.S. steel imports from a named country is represented by 
the coefficients for duty, duty and decision interaction, and weighted duty and duty+ interaction. 
The signs are negative for both duty and the interaction between duty and decision, but the sign 
for the interaction between weighted duty and duty+ is positive, although the value is almost 
zero. This again shows the decrease in steel imports from these named countries. The controls 
also continue to display the correct sign. 
The fourth column displays the results for the regression with weighted duty and the real 
exchange rate ratios. We see that for a 1% increase in weighted duty leads to U.S. steel imports 
from a non-named country to increase by 0.249%. Again, this shows evidence of trade diversion 
from named countries to non-named countries. This means that U.S. steel firms are being left in 
a worse off position than what was intended from the antidumping duties. We see that steel 
imports from named countries decrease once again. The ratios for real exchange rate also show 









 These results show that imports from a named country will decrease after implementing 
an AD Duty, while imports from a non-named country will increase. Each coefficient, though, is 
in regard to just one named country or one non-named country. Due to this, the amount of trade 
diversion or destruction is difficult to comprehend. In order to provide a better picture of the 
extent of trade destruction/diversion, a simulation example was created.  
Table 4: Results-Antidumping Duty and Country Group 








lnDuty -0.3641*** -0.4037*** -0.3725** -0.3871** 
 (0.1318) (0.1326) (0.1489) (0.1528) 
lnDuty*Decision -0.8007*** -0.9154*** -0.7379*** -1.2682 *** 
 (0.254) (0.2804) (0.2507) (0.2895) 
lnWeightedDuty   0.0881** 0.2498** 
   (0.1219) (0.1461) 
lnWeightedDuty*Duty+   -0.0021 0.3291 
   (0.2364) (0.2499) 
lnUSProdPriceIndex 0.9979***  1.151***  
 (0.2187)  (0.2156)  
lnForeignPrice -1.3663***  -1.364***  
 (0.0161)  (0.0161)  
lnExchangeRate 0.0252***  0.0222**  
 (0.0091)  (0.0095)  
lnForeignProduction 0.0127*** 0.0171*** 0.0127*** 0.0055 
 (0.0027) (0.0027) (0.0161) (0.0033) 
lnFPriceij-lnFPricei  -1.3399***  -1.3442*** 
  (0.0151)  (0.0151) 
lnFPricei-lnER-lnPPI  -0.0185***  -0.0165*** 
  (0.005)  (0.0048) 
ln(Imports in t-1) 0.0823*** 0.0844*** 0.0834*** 0.0819*** 
 (0.0036) (0.0037) (0.0037) (0.0037) 
Constant 6.1688*** 9.7975*** 5.568*** 9.968*** 
 (1.0534) (0.2288) (1.0419) (0.2382) 
     
Observations 64,045 64,045 64,045 64,045 
Number of groups 1,439 1,439 1,439 1,439 
Within R-squared 0.504 0.484 0.502 0.493 
Notes: Standard errors in parentheses. Clustered at country and product level. Month, Year, and 
Product dummies controlled, but not reported. 
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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 The simulation looks at one antidumping duty on Taiwan for a specific steel product 
category (7208.10). The first part of the simulation focuses on Taiwan and the change in U.S. 
imports from them from the month prior to the duty being initiated and the month the duty is 
initiated. The coefficients from Table 4 column 1 are multiplied by the values of those variables 
for Taiwan in both of these months. For each month, the multiplied values are summed together 
to get the predicted value for the logarithm of U.S. imports. The exponent of that predicted value 
is taken in order to get the simulated amount of U.S. imports for each month. Those simulated 
values are shown in Table 5. The percentage change in simulated imports in the month prior to 
initiation and the month of initiation is calculated and reported as a decrease by 8.08%. That 
shows the trade destruction that occurs after initiated the AD duty on Taiwan. 
 The next part of the simulation focuses on all 27 non-named countries for this particular 
AD duty. The coefficients from column 3 of Table 4 are used in this simulation since it includes 
the weighted duty variable. Each separate countries variable values for the two month periods are 
multiplied by the corresponding coefficient. These multiplied values are summed for each 
separate country and then exponent for each of those summed values is taken. Then the exponent 
value for each non-named country is summed together to get the simulated imports for all non-
named countries in each respective month. Those values are presented in Table 5 as well. The 
percentage change in simulated imports for non-named countries in the month prior to initiation 
and month of initiation is shown to be an increase of 4.56%. 
 
Table 5: Example of Duty Initiation Effect on Change in U.S. Imports 




Month Prior to Duty 
Initiation 
Simulated 




Taiwan 7208.10 1 643 591 -8.08% 
Non-named 
Countries 7208.10 27 34503 36078 +4.56% 
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 Through this simulation example, we see that imports from the named country do 
decrease after initiating a duty. We also see the total amount of trade diversion, instead of 
changes in imports from just one non-named country. The simulation shows an increase in 
imports from non-named countries by 4.56% once the duty is initiated. This provides a better 
picture of how imports from all non-named countries of a specific duty change.  
 One more step that is taken is running the regression solely on Taiwan for this steel 
product code. After running the regression, the regression’s coefficients are used in the same way 
as the previous simulation. This is done to test the robustness of the simulation and regression. 




The robustness check simulation also shows a decrease in U.S. imports from Taiwan. 
Table 6 shows that once the duty is initiated, imports decrease by 3.13%. This is less than what 
we saw in the previous simulation, but it is still showing the trade destruction effect that we were 
expecting would happen. 
 
5. Conclusion and Extensions 
 The evidence presented in this paper shows how retaliatory tariffs can impact trade 
patterns differently based on whether or not a country is initiated/imposed with an antidumping 
duty. The imports from named countries are negatively effected by initiation of the retaliatory 
Table 6: Robustness Check Example of Duty Initiation Effect on Change in U.S. Imports 
Country Steel Product Code 
Simulated Imports Month Prior 
to Duty Initiation 
Simulated Imports 
Month of Duty Initiation 
Percent 
Change 
Taiwan 7208.10 1980 1918 -3.13% 
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tariffs and then decrease even further once the tariff is imposed, which is one of the goals of 
these tariffs. Trade diversion was also shown to take place, since imports from non-named 
countries increase once a duty is initiated/imposed. Malhotra, Rus, and Kassam (2008) found no 
significant amount of trade diversion in the U.S. agriculture sector when imposing antidumping 
duties, so the steel industry may have a higher elasticity of substitution than the agriculture 
industry, which allows for more trade diversion to take place. 
 These results may also be applicable to President Trump’s retaliatory tariffs. Those tariffs 
may have the intended impact on U.S. imports from named countries, which would help fight 
against foreign companies that are dumping. What needs to be taken into account, though, is the 
trade diversion from the retaliatory tariffs. The evidence presented in this paper shows that trade 
diversion does take place and that will leave U.S. firms in a not as favorable position as intended. 
Policy makers must understand that antidumping duties and other retaliatory tariffs can be 
effective at reducing named country imports, but other consequences can take place that reduce 
the effectiveness of these tariffs. 
 There are some extensions of this paper that could be explored further in future studies. 
Studies could focus on the countries/companies that are most commonly imposed with 
antidumping duties and see how the results change. Those countries have many companies that 
are dumping their product into the U.S. and specifically focusing on these foreign companies 
could help increase the understanding of the effectiveness of antidumping duties on the most 
accused companies. Other studies could also attempt to control for U.S. prices by using more 
precise measurement of each product. Studies could also attempt to see the impact of time after 
imposing a duty. It would be interesting to see if these effects continue in the long-run. 
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 Lastly, there is the idea of a domino effect for U.S. imports related to expectations. If 
U.S. importers can have some type of expectation of which foreign companies/countries will be 
imposed with a duty in the near future, then it is possible that their import decisions could be 
impacted by those expectations. They may not import from a relatively cheap foreign exporter 
since they believe that it will be imposed with an antidumping duty soon, and instead they will 
import from another more expensive exporter that is not at risk of being imposed with an 
antidumping duty, according to their expectations. Being able to formulate a variable to account 
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